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PRESERVING MINORS’ RIGHTS AFTER
CASEY: THE “NEW BATTLEFIELD”∗ OF
NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY
STATUTES
PAMMELA S. QUINN∗∗
INTRODUCTION
Every day in the United States, hundreds of minors1 walk into
abortion clinics seeking to terminate unwanted pregnancies.2 Each of
∗ Okpalobi v. Foster, 981 F. Supp. 977, 986 (E.D. La. 1998), aff’d 190 F.3d 337 (5th Cir.
1999). Regarding the statute it was evaluating (which arguably imposed strict liability on abor-
tion providers whose minor patients had not obtained required parental consent), the Okpalobi
court stated: “The instant statute presents a new battlefield—that is unconstitutional regulation
of abortion providers so as to directly strike at a woman’s right of choice.” Id.
∗∗ I would like to express my thanks to Kerry Quinn, who devoted so much time to help-
ing me with this project. I cannot give enough credit for her help in developing, editing, and
researching this Note.
1. In writing this Note, I wrestled with the problem of whether to use the term “girls” or
“young women” to describe pregnant minors who must face and make the decision of whether
to terminate their pregnancies. Unfortunately, no descriptive term recognizes the level of
autonomy young women must have in making potentially life-altering decisions, without also
denigrating the problem of young pregnant girls who do not, and in some cases cannot, under-
stand the potential consequences of their decisions.
In the end, I decided to use the term “minor,” which is admittedly not without problems.
The gender-neutral often sounds awkward, precisely because only women and girls face the
problem of making the ultimate decision regarding an unwanted pregnancy. Although the term
may not capture all of the meaning I would like to suggest in referring to this group of pregnant
teenagers, at least it does not imply anything that I do not wish to imply.
This problem—the lack of a word capturing the full reality of this particular situation—is
highlighted in H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981). In Matheson’s majority opinion, which
found a notification statute to be constitutionally permissible, Chief Justice Burger referred to
the class represented by appellant as “unmarried minor girls.” Id. at 405. Justice Marshall in-
sisted on referring to this same group as “all minor women,” as he argued that the notification
provision was an unconstitutional restriction on their rights. Id. at 431 (emphasis deleted)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
2. In 1992, 960,180 teenagers in the United States became pregnant. See Stanley K. Hen-
shaw, Teenage Abortion and Pregnancy Statistics by State, 1992, FAM. PLAN. PERSP., May/June
1997, at 115, 118 tbl.3. Of the teens who became pregnant in 1992, 36.9% obtained an abortion.
See id. at 117 tbl.1. This means that approximately 354,000 teenagers obtained abortions in the
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these minors has a constitutional right to an abortion.3 Yet, most of
them will be turned away from the clinics they enter, unless they
happen to bring with them a note from a parent. Permission slips, or
some type of written proof that a parent is aware of his minor child’s
abortion decision, are mandated in most jurisdictions.4 Once placed
on file at the clinic, these permission slips protect the abortion pro-
viders from liability. Or, at least until recently, abortion providers
have assumed so.
Not long ago, sixteen-year-old Mukeshia Jackson entered an
abortion clinic in Raleigh, North Carolina.5 Jackson brought with her
same year that Casey was decided, or an average of nearly one thousand per day.
3. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (holding unconstitutional
a blanket parental consent requirement as a condition for an unmarried minor to obtain an
abortion).
4. Forty states have on their books a statute requiring either parental consent or parental
notice before a minor can obtain an abortion. See ALA. CODE § 26-21-3(a) (1992) (consent);
ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.020(1) (Michie 1998) (consent); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152(A)
(West Supp. 1998) (consent); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-801 (Michie 1991) (notice); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123450(a) (West 1996) (consent); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-
37.5-104(1) (West 1999) (notice); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1783 (1997) (notice); Parental No-
tice of Abortion Act, 1999 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 99-322, § 1 (West) (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
ch. 390.01115) (notice); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-112 (a)(1) (1999) (notice); IDAHO CODE § 18-
609(6) (1997) (notice); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/15 (West 1999) (notice); IND. CODE
ANN. § 16-34-2-4(a) (Michie 1993) (consent); IOWA CODE ANN. § 135L.3 (1) (West Supp.
1999) (notice); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705(a) (Supp. 1998) (notice); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
311.732(2)(a) (Banks-Baldwin 1997) (consent); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.5(A)(1)
(West Supp. 1999) (consent); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1597-A(2)(A) (West 1992) (con-
sent); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12S (Law. Co-op. 1991) (consent); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 722.903 (West 1993) (consent); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(2) (West 1998) (notice);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-53(1) (1993) (consent); MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.028(1)(1) (West 1996)
(consent); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-204 (1997) (notice); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-6902(1)
(Michie 1998) (notice); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 442.255(1) (Michie 1996) (notice); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-5-1 (Michie 1994) (consent); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.7(a) (1997) (consent);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03(1) (1997) (notice); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.12(B)(1)(a)
(Anderson 1998) (notice and consent); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206(a) (West Supp. 1999)
(consent); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-6 (1996) (consent); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-31(A)(1)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998) (consent); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-7 (Michie Supp. 1999)
(notice); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-303(a) (1996) (consent); An Act Relating to Notification
Before an Abortion May Be Performed on Certain Minors, 1999 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 395
(West) (to be codified at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.002 (West)) (notice); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-7-304(2) (1995) (notice); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(V) (Michie 1999) (notice); W. VA.
CODE § 16-2F-3(a) (1998) (notice); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.375(4)(1) (West 1997) (consent);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-118(a) (Michie 1999) (notice and consent).
Note that the Idaho and Utah statutes require that notice be provided to a minor’s par-
ents or legal guardian only “if possible.” IDAHO CODE § 18-609(6) (1997); UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-7-304(2) (1995).
5. See Jackson ex rel. Robinson v. A Woman’s Choice, Inc., 503 S.E.2d 422, 423 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1998).
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a permission slip, consisting of a written note stating that she had her
mother’s permission to obtain an abortion, as was mandated under
North Carolina law.6 The note was apparently signed by Jackson’s
mother, Alfreda Robinson.
When Jackson presented this note, both the clinic office man-
ager and Dr. Washington, an abortion provider employed by the
clinic, asked Jackson whether her mother had written and signed the
note. After receiving verbal confirmation from Jackson that her
mother had indeed written and signed it, Dr. Washington complied
with legally required counseling requirements and obtained Jackson’s
written request and consent to perform the abortion procedure. At
this point, only after he was certain that he had complied fully with
each of the several legal requirements, Dr. Washington performed
the abortion.
Unfortunately, Jackson had lied. The signature on the note she
presented was not her mother’s, but was forged by Jackson herself.
Unluckily for Dr. Washington and the clinic, Jackson’s parents found
out about her abortion and decided to sue on their daughter’s behalf
for negligent infliction of emotional distress.7 The lawsuit contained
no allegations of medical malpractice. In fact, Jackson and her par-
ents agreed that the abortion had not resulted in any physical compli-
cations. Dr. Washington and the abortion clinic faced potential puni-
tive and compensatory damages solely because they had not guessed
or ascertained that the note Jackson brought with her had been
forged.8
The trial court dismissed Jackson’s claim.9 On appeal, the Court
of Appeals of North Carolina affirmed, holding that the North Caro-
lina statute requiring written consent by a parent did not impose a
strict liability duty on doctors to determine the validity of the signa-
ture.10
However, the issue has yet to be resolved in most other states.11
Even in North Carolina, doctors and clinics cannot be sure they do
6. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90.21.7(a) (1997).
7. See Jackson, 503 S.E.2d at 423.
8. See id. at 423-24.
9. See id. at 424.
10. See id. at 426.
11. The only states in which the issue has been considered to date are South Dakota, Lou-
isiana, and North Carolina. See Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452,
1467-68 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that the potential chilling effect of the challenged South Da-
kota statute caused it to be “an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose whether to termi-
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not face future liability for failing to detect permission slip forgeries,
since the North Carolina Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue.12
Moreover, even if the North Carolina Supreme Court eventually rati-
fies the appellate court’s decision, the future is uncertain for Dr.
Washington and his cohorts in the state of North Carolina. The leg-
islature could amend the statute to explicitly create strict liability for
abortion providers who perform abortions on minors without actual
parental consent. Such a statute could also require that abortion pro-
viders police their minor patients.
The uncertainty doctors face as a result of parental consent stat-
utes is problematic. Doctors who fear potential liability for failing to
detect fraud would be well advised to refrain from performing abor-
tions on all young women who appear as if they might be under the
age of eighteen. Indeed, a doctor with considerably more patient
documentation than the note presented by Mukeshia Jackson will
never be absolutely sure of evading fraud. Even if a teenager is ac-
companied by an adult claiming to be a parent, the doctor cannot be
nate her pre-viability pregnancy”); Okpalobi v. Foster, 981 F. Supp. 977, 986 (E.D. La. 1998),
aff’d 190 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that Louisiana’s strict liability statute would “impose
an undue burden on women seeking abortions in Louisiana” and invalidating the statute);
Jackson, 503 S.E.2d at 425 (refusing to construe North Carolina’s consent statute to impose
strict liability on abortion providers, since such an interpretation “would raise a serious consti-
tutional question”).
A somewhat similar case from Tennessee resulted in summary judgment being affirmed
in favor of a doctor who had performed an abortion on a minor two months before her eight-
eenth birthday. See McGlothlin v. Bristol Obstetrics, Gynecology & Family Planning, Inc., No.
03A01-9706-CV-00236, 1998 WL 65459 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 1998). The doctor in
McGlothlin did not provide the patient’s parents with notice of the abortion, as required under
Tennessee law. See id. at *2 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-202(f) (1995)). However, be-
cause the statute did not contain a judicial bypass (as is constitutionally required, see infra notes
30-39), the court found it unconstitutional under both the federal and Tennessee constitutions,
thereby exonerating the doctor’s failure to comply with the statute. See id. at *4. Moreover, the
court invoked the “mature minor” doctrine as alternate grounds for upholding summary judg-
ment in favor of defendants. See id. at *5. This doctrine is a common law exception to the gen-
eral requirement that parents must consent before their children can receive medical treat-
ment. It allows a physician to perform medical treatment on minors who have the maturity to
consent to the treatment without obtaining simultaneous consent from a parent. See, e.g.,
Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 755 (Tenn. 1987) (adopting the “mature minor” exception
in Tennessee). The existence of this doctrine is the reason that parental consent laws for abor-
tion are especially onerous—before performing most medical procedures, doctors need only
ascertain that the patient is mature (rather than actually 18 years old) in order to avoid liability
for failing to obtain parental consent.
12. Nor will the North Carolina Supreme Court have occasion to consider the question
until another suit analogous to Jackson’s is brought. The North Carolina Supreme Court has
denied review of the court of appeals decision. See Jackson ex rel. Robinson v. A Woman’s
Choice, Inc., 517 S.E.2d 896, 897 (N.C. 1998).
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certain that the adult is who he claims to be. Moreover, a prospective
patient who represents herself to be over eighteen may be lying or
carrying particularly convincing false identification.
However, while refusing to perform abortions on anyone who
appears to be under eighteen would absolutely protect abortion pro-
viders from liability, such a solution raises troubling constitutional
problems. Seemingly innocuous statutes, ostensibly passed with the
purpose of protecting immature minors from making bad decisions,
may become the de facto means of preventing minors from exercising
their constitutional right to obtain pre-viability abortions.
In this Note, I argue that statutes that would hold abortion pro-
viders liable for failing to ensure that their minor patients have actu-
ally obtained legal consent are generally unconstitutional. The poten-
tial for liability would deter abortion providers from performing
abortions on minors. This chilling effect would make it difficult or
impossible for minors to obtain abortions, a result that is incompati-
ble with a minor’s constitutional right to choose this medical proce-
dure.
Part I of this Note examines the existing state of the law regard-
ing the right of a minor to obtain an abortion. Part II discusses why
the “undue burden” standard articulated by the Supreme Court in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey13 is the proper one for lower courts to
apply in evaluating the constitutionality of statutes that regulate
abortions performed on minors. In Part III, I argue that certain types
of statutory and common law tort liability for abortion providers are
unconstitutional. The potential for liability would create an unconsti-
tutional chilling effect on the willingness of abortion providers to per-
form abortions on minors and those who appear to be minors. Stat-
utes creating such a chilling effect, I conclude, work an undue burden
on the right to obtain an abortion. Then, in Part IV, I examine and
reject the counterargument that refusing to impose liability on abor-
tion providers would effectively make consent statutes unenforce-
able.
I. A MINOR’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF CHOICE
Although the disagreement over the constitutional right to abor-
tion has generally been vigorous, and even violent, perhaps the vari-
ous advocates on each side of the debate agree on one point. This
13. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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point may be only that the Supreme Court’s current articulation of
abortion rights jurisprudence emanates from a tremendously com-
plex and confusing line of cases handed down over the past twenty-
six years. In this already difficult area, attempting to articulate the
rights of minors is even harder.
The case law at least establishes that the Constitution gives
women a fundamental right to choose abortion.14 Further, this right
clearly extends to minors.15 The Supreme Court has also recognized
that the states have certain compelling interests that justify some
regulation of abortion generally16 and regulation of minors particu-
larly.17 Nearly every state has a statute, or statutes, regulating a preg-
nant minor’s right to choose an abortion.18 A brief summary of how
the Supreme Court has dealt with abortion over the past twenty-six
years provides helpful background to the analysis of current statutory
efforts at regulation.
A. Minors’ Constitutional Right to an Abortion: Roe v. Wade and
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth
In 1973, the Supreme Court first announced that pregnant
women have a constitutional right to choose abortion. That case, of
course, was Roe v. Wade.19 The much-maligned decision20 articulated
the now-infamous trimester framework.
The Roe opinion, authored for the Court by Justice Blackmun,
discusses the right of privacy inherent in the Due Process Clause of
14. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 845-53 (1992) (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
15. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
16. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
17. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-34 (1979).
18. Forty states have either parental consent or parental notice requirements for minors
who seek abortions. See supra note 4. Parental consent statutes require the written consent of a
parent before a minor may obtain an abortion, while parental notice statutes require that actual
or constructive notice be given to a parent before a doctor may perform an abortion on a mi-
nor. Each of the parental consent statutes has a judicial bypass procedure built in, as required
by Bellotti. Most of the notice statutes contain an identical bypass procedure, although the fed-
eral courts are divided over whether Bellotti applies to notice statutes, and the Supreme Court
has never explicitly ruled on the issue. For a more detailed discussion on this point, see infra
Part I.C.2. Although the language of the statutes may vary slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion, the consent statutes are all very similar to one another, as are the notice statutes.
19. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
20. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920 (1973). Professor Ely’s objections to Roe have been cited by innumerable schol-
ars and judges over the past 26 years.
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the Fourteenth Amendment and concludes that this privacy right “is
broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy.”21 However, Justice Blackmun cautions that
the right to choose to terminate a pregnancy is not absolute; instead,
because the state has an interest in “safeguarding health, in main-
taining medical standards, and in protecting potential life,” abortion
may be regulated when these interests are implicated.22
Despite holding very generally that women have a constitutional
right of choice, Roe expressly declined to consider whether an un-
married minor woman also could exercise this right.23 However, three
years later, in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,24 the Court declared
unconstitutional a statute requiring parental consent before a minor
could obtain an abortion. The Court, in an opinion also authored by
Justice Blackmun, explained that the provision of the statute requir-
ing parental consent was unconstitutional because it might prevent a
minor from exercising her constitutional right simply because of a po-
tentially arbitrary veto by a parent.25
In Danforth, Justice Blackmun establishes that minors also have
a constitutional right to choose abortion. Indeed, he states firmly that
“[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically
only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as
well as adults, are protected by the Constitution . . . .”26 Justice
Blackmun makes clear that the state may not give absolute veto
power over the minor’s decision, even to the minor’s parent or par-
ents.27 This is so, Justice Blackmun asserts, because any interest the
state might have in allowing parents to make their minor daughter’s
abortion decision does not outweigh the right of the minor to choose
abortion, a right that is “protected by the Constitution.”28 Justice
Blackmun specifically rejects the notion that the state’s interest in
protecting the family unit and parental authority justifies parental
veto power when that veto might be exercised arbitrarily.29
21. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
22. Id. at 154.
23. See id. at 165 n.67.
24. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
25. See id. at 72-75.
26. Id. at 74.
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. See id.
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Abortion rights generally, and a minor’s right to obtain an abor-
tion in particular, are thus firmly established in Danforth. However,
unlike Roe, which was decided by a fairly solid majority of seven,
Danforth enjoyed a bare 5-4 majority. The closeness of the decision
suggests the uneasiness that accompanies the Court’s acknowledge-
ment of a minor’s right to terminate her pregnancy and anticipates
the Court’s subsequent decisions limiting the right to abortion.
B. Limitations on the Constitutional Right to Abortion: Bellotti v.
Baird and Planned Parenthood v. Casey
Only three years after deciding Danforth, the Supreme Court
began to place limitations on the constitutional right articulated in
Roe and further explained in Danforth. In Bellotti v. Baird,30 the
Court issued the first in a series of decisions clarifying that minors do
not enjoy the same unchecked right to choose abortion as their adult
counterparts.
Justice Powell wrote the plurality opinion in Bellotti, which has
since been confirmed by a majority of the Supreme Court.31 In it, he
examined a Massachusetts statute that limited a minor’s ability to ob-
tain an abortion by requiring the minor to obtain the consent of ei-
ther a parent or a judge. To begin his analysis, Justice Powell con-
firms that there are “three reasons justifying the conclusion that the
constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of
adults: the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance
of the parental role in child rearing.”32
Justice Powell does indicate agreement with the essential hold-
ing of Danforth: “The need to preserve the constitutional right and
the unique nature of the abortion decision, especially when made by
30. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
31. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 511-13 (1990).
32. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634 (declaring unconstitutional a statute requiring all unmarried
minors seeking abortions to obtain either the consent of both parents or the approval of a supe-
rior court judge). Moreover, a state’s interest in protecting the family unit and a parent’s con-
trol of his child’s upbringing are also values grounded in the Constitution, making them com-
pelling. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972) (recognizing parents’ interest in
the religious upbringing and education of their children by striking down a state law compelling
formal school attendance); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (noting that
the Act challenged in the lawsuit “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923) (supporting the right of parents to exercise some control
over the education of their children).
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a minor, require a State to act with particular sensitivity when it leg-
islates to foster parental involvement in this matter.”33 Because of the
aforementioned interest in protecting minors from their immaturity,
however, Justice Powell concludes that some regulation of abortion is
permissible. States can require parental consent, so long as the minor
is provided with a judicial bypass option and can “go directly to a
court without first consulting or notifying her parents.”34 Justice Pow-
ell also makes clear that a minor’s request must be approved by a
court if the minor can prove either that she is “mature and well
enough informed to make intelligently the abortion decision on her
own” or “that an abortion . . . would be in her best interests.”35 Thus,
a judge has very limited discretion to deny a minor’s request to have
an abortion without parental consent. Only a minor whose best inter-
ests would not be served by an abortion and who is deemed immature
may be refused a judicial bypass.
Bellotti has become the standard by which the lower federal
courts measure the constitutionality of parental consent statutes.36
Statutes that do not contain a judicial bypass procedure exactly like
the one outlined by Justice Powell are routinely invalidated.37 In the-
ory, of course, lower court judges can always foreclose the minor’s
decision by declaring her to be immature.38 When this abuse of judi-
33. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642.
34. Id. at 647.
35. Id. at 647-48. The Court recognizes that certain factors such as “education, employ-
ment skills, financial resources and emotional maturity” could make an unwanted pregnancy
“exceptionally burdensome for a minor.” To deny a minor the right to make the decision to
terminate her pregnancy could, in some situations, result in “grave and indelible” conse-
quences—a decision against her best interest. Id. at 642.
36. See, e.g., Manning v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254, 262-63 (4th Cir. 1997) (determining that a
state law requiring parental consent for a minor’s abortion satisfied the Bellotti criteria).
37. See, e.g., Causeway Med. Suite v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096, 1110 (5th Cir. 1997) (invali-
dating the modification of Louisiana’s parental consent statute, which had increased judicial
discretion to refuse bypasses of the consent statute).
38. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.5 (West Supp. 1999) (authorizing courts to
deny a waiver of parental notice upon determining that the minor is not mature and that the
abortion is not in her best interest); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §1597-A(6)(D) (West 1992)
(same except authorizing a judicial waiver of parental consent); N.D. CENT. CODE §14-02.1-
03.1(5) (1997) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241 (Michie 1999) (same as the previously cited
Louisiana statute); see also Patricia Donovan, Judging Teenagers: How Minors Fare When They
Seek Court-Authorized Abortions, FAM. PLAN. PERSP., Nov./Dec. 1983, at 259, 259 (arguing
that “although the judicial bypass laws and procedures . . . may appear reasonable and work-
able on paper, in practice they constitute a serious, and in some cases insurmountable, barrier
confronting minors who wish to obtain abortions”). The reaction of judges to the task of deter-
mining the maturity of minors has varied. One judge from Minnesota calls the expectation of
assessing a minor’s maturity in five minutes “almost absurd.” Id. at 267. A judge from Massa-
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cial power occurs, it undoubtedly frustrates some minors who desire
to abort without parental consent. However, such misappropriation
of authority is often checked upon expedited appeal to appellate
judges recognizing their constitutional duty.39
Bellotti, which allows states to regulate a minor’s abortion deci-
sion in order to ensure that it is informed, foreshadowed the Court’s
decision in Casey. Casey was decided in 1992, after a number of split
decisions that hinted the Court might overrule Roe.40 Casey generally
affirms Roe, declaring that Roe was correct in its essential holding
that women possess a constitutional right to choose abortion.41 How-
ever, the “undue burden” standard it articulates grants the state more
power of regulation than did Roe, undermining the ability of adult
women to exercise their right to choose with absolute impunity.42
The structure of the Casey decision is somewhat unusual, with a
controlling “joint opinion,” co-authored by Justices O’Connor, Ken-
nedy, and Souter.43 Although not a majority opinion, Casey repre-
sents the minimum baseline against which abortion regulations must
be measured, since Justices Blackmun and Stevens would have more
severely limited the states’ ability to regulate abortion than does the
“undue burden” test articulated by the joint opinion writers.44
chusetts believes that she can learn enough in that period of time to make this judgment. See id.
Another Massachusetts judge thinks the law “utterly preposterous” and charges that “the
Court is a pure rubber stamp. All the law does is to harass kids. It sets up a barrier to abortion.”
Id. One judge, however, has noted that judges faced with bypass petitions have virtually no
choice but to approve them. See Hiller B. Zobel, Judges and Abortion: The Judicial Question
Becomes Political, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 17, 1984, at 16. Judge Zobel notes that
judges who attempt to block a minor from obtaining a judicial bypass are always reversed. See
id.
39. See, e.g., In the Matter of Doe, 485 S.E.2d 354, 356-357 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997).
40. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (validating the state’s
requirement of a viability test and recognizing the state’s right to restrict the use of public em-
ployees and facilities for abortions when the mother’s life is not in danger); Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 771-72, 782-84, 813-14
(1986) (holding unconstitutional under Roe a statute that three of the four dissenters would
have upheld under that standard).
41. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (joint opinion of
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
42. See id.
43. Id. at 843-901.
44. See id. at 920 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that he
would apply the “undue burden” test to find the 24-hour waiting period unconstitutional); id. at
934 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part) (saying that he would find the 24-hour waiting period unconstitutional under strict scru-
tiny analysis). Thus, the “undue burden” standard is controlling law since the Supreme Court
has held that the most limited basis of a decision becomes law. See Marks v. United States, 430
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Before examining the Pennsylvania statute at issue in Casey, the
joint opinion rejects the trimester framework of Roe and replaces it
with a similar but different standard. The opinion concludes that
drawing a line at viability is appropriate.45 Thus, “before [viability]
the woman has a right to choose to terminate her pregnancy.”46 How-
ever, a State may regulate abortion in order to “ensure that this
choice [of abortion] is thoughtful and informed.”47 The opinion then
states the proper test of when a state regulation exceeds its constitu-
tional limits: “where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a
woman’s ability to make this decision . . . the power of the State” in-
terferes unconstitutionally with the right to choose abortion.48 Undue
burden is defined as “a state regulation [that] has the purpose or ef-
fect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”49
Such vague language makes the correct outcome of any particu-
lar case difficult to determine.50 Considering the joint opinion’s appli-
cation of its own standard is therefore helpful. First, the opinion con-
cludes that the twenty-four-hour waiting requirement mandated
under Pennsylvania law does not constitute an undue burden, but
admits that the question is a close one.51 Only because the party
challenging the statute failed to include in the record that the waiting
period constituted a “substantial” obstacle for the group most im-
peded by it does the wait not constitute an undue burden.52
Though not finding a wait of twenty-four hours so onerous as to
constitute a “substantial obstacle,” the joint opinion does hold that
the Pennsylvania spousal notification law constituted an undue bur-
den.53 Further, the reasoning behind the opinion writers’ holding that
U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale ex-
plaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds . . . .’”) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
45. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 870.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 872.
48. Id. at 874 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 877.
50. For example, the joint opinion neither defines “substantial obstacle” nor indicates at
what point an obstacle becomes “substantial.”
51. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 885-87.
52. See id. at 886.
53. See id. at 898.
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the notification provisions constituted an undue burden provides a
way of evaluating other regulatory statutes. For example, the opinion
notably rejects the contention that the statute is not an “undue bur-
den,” even though its application would hamper only one percent of
women from obtaining elective abortions.54 Instead, the Court holds
that the statutory notice requirement constitutes an undue burden
because “[t]he [undue burden] analysis does not end with the one
percent of women upon whom the statute operates; it begins
there . . . . The proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for
whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is ir-
relevant.”55 Moreover, the opinion goes on to say that a statutory
provision “is an undue burden” if, “in a large fraction of the cases in
which [that provision] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial ob-
stacle to a woman’s choice to undergo an abortion.”56
C. Current Abortion Regulations Aimed at Minors
Since Bellotti and Casey, states have enacted many different
types of statutes to regulate the abortion decision. The regulations
most relevant to this Note are those having a potentially chilling ef-
fect on abortion providers performing abortions on minors. These
and other types of regulations are outlined below, following a brief
discussion of parental consent and parental notice requirements, the
most prevalent types of abortion regulations.
1. Parental Consent Requirements. As mentioned above,
parental consent statutes must, under Bellotti, meet certain
requirements in order to be constitutional.57 Because the state has an
interest in ensuring that minors are protected from making immature
decisions, it may pass certain types of regulations that foster parental
involvement in the minor’s decisionmaking process.58 However,
because the state’s interest in assuring that the minor’s decision is
informed cannot absolutely overcome the minor’s right of choice, the
statutes regulating minors must not be so broad as to undercut the
minor’s right to choose.59 Thus, consent statutes may not require
54. See id. at 894.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 895.
57. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
58. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979) (plurality).
59. See id.
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consent by more than one parent.60 Moreover, because there may be
no arbitrary veto of a minor’s choice, parental consent statutes must
contain a valid judicial bypass.61
In order to obtain a judicial bypass of a parental consent statute,
the minor must file a petition with a court.62 Typically, upon the peti-
tion being filed, a guardian ad litem is appointed to represent the mi-
nor’s interests before the court.63 Then, a state trial court judge will
hold a hearing, in which she makes a determination of whether there
is cause to grant the bypass—that is, whether the minor is mature or,
if immature, whether the abortion is in the best interests of the mi-
nor.64 This hearing will normally take place in a timely manner, i.e.,
within a few days of the filing of the petition.65 If the minor’s petition
is denied by the judge, she may appeal the decision. Appeals are also
expedited to assure that the minor is able to obtain an abortion in a
timely manner should a bypass be granted.66
Twenty states currently have a parental consent requirement for
minors wishing to obtain abortions.67 The statutes vary slightly from
state to state,68 but each contains a judicial bypass that is nearly al-
ways modeled after the Bellotti language.69 Indeed, statutes contain-
60. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 457 (1990).
61. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44.
62. One such example is South Carolina’s law, which states that “[e]very minor has the
right to petition the court for an order granting her the right to obtain an abortion without the
[parental] consent [otherwise] required [by statute] . . . .” S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-32 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1998). This statute, typical of its kind, sets forth the procedure a minor would follow
in petitioning the court for a waiver of the parental consent requirement.
63. See, e.g., id. § 44-41-32(3).
64. See, e.g., id. § 44-41-32(5).
65. See, e.g., id.
66. See, e.g., id. § 44-41-34(A).
67. See statutes cited supra note 4.
68. The statutes are all nearly identical and indeed often contain nearly identical language.
Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.903(1) (West 1993) (“[A] person shall not perform
an abortion on a minor without first obtaining the written consent of . . . 1 of the parents or the
legal guardian of the minor.”), with ALA. CODE § 26-21-3(a) (1992) (“[N]o person shall per-
form an abortion upon an unemancipated minor unless he . . . first obtains the written consent
of either parent or the legal guardian of the minor.”).
69. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.904(4)(3) (West 1993). The Michigan statute
provides:
The probate court shall grant a waiver of parental consent if it finds either of the
following:
(a) The minor is sufficiently mature and well-enough informed to make the decision
regarding abortion independently of her parents or legal guardian.
(b) The waiver would be in the best interests of the minor.
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ing language that does not conform to the Bellotti opinion’s standard
have usually been held unconstitutional.70
2. Parental Notice Requirements. Most states that do not have a
parental consent statute have a parental notice requirement.71 Such
statutes allow minors to make the abortion decision without parental
approval, but require the abortion provider or the minor to notify a
parent as a requirement of obtaining the abortion procedure.72
Because they pose less of a restriction than consent statutes on the
minor’s ability to choose abortion, notification statutes may require
the involvement of both parents in order to avoid running afoul of
the Constitution.73
Notification statutes can take several forms. Some states require
the minor to present the abortion provider and clinic with a signed
note stating that the minor has notified her parent (or parents74) of
her decision to have the abortion. In other states, the minor faces a
waiting period before having the abortion, during which time the
parent is officially notified of the abortion by the abortion provider.75
As the Supreme Court has never explicitly ruled on the question,
exactly what types of notification requirements would constitute an
undue burden is not entirely clear. Indeed, there is no clear answer
even to the question of whether a judicial bypass like the one out-
lined in Bellotti is required.76 The lower federal courts are somewhat
70. See, e.g., Causeway Med. Suite v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096, 1108-10 (5th Cir. 1997)
(holding unconstitutional the judicial bypass procedure of Louisiana’s parental consent statute,
because its language, which provided that judges “may” grant a bypass, failed to require judges
to grant the bypass, as is constitutionally required). But see Planned Parenthood v. Camblos,
155 F.3d 352, 383 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (holding that the word “may” does not make the
bypass procedure invalid, as the judges who will be granting bypasses should be presumed to
exercise discretion only insofar as they will be acting constitutionally).
71. Currently, 21 states have a parental notice requirement. See statutes cited supra note 4.
72. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1783 (1997) (requiring notice be given to a minor’s
parent at least 24 hours prior to an abortion’s being performed on the minor); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 144.343(2) (West 1998) (same with 48 hours’ notice); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-7
(Michie Supp. 1999) (same with 48 hours’ notice).
73. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 456-58 (1990).
74. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1783 (requiring notice of “one or both” parents
before an abortion may be performed on a minor). The notification provision upheld in Hodg-
son required notification of both the minor’s parents, with some exceptions. See Hodgson, 497
U.S. at 422.
75. See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 72.
76. See Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 295 (1997) (per curiam) (noting that the stat-
ute approved in a prior decision had a judicial bypass provision, which suggests that one might
be constitutionally required); Jennifer C. Friedman, Note, Parental Notice in State Abortion
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split on the question.77 Although the issue has not come up often, at
least one court has decided that a judicial bypass is required78 because
the notification requirement, like a consent requirement, is permissi-
ble only when the state has a valid interest in mandating parental in-
volvement in order to protect minors from making immature deci-
sions. Bellotti makes clear that this state interest becomes invalid
when the minor demonstrates either that she is capable of making a
mature decision or that parental involvement is not in her best inter-
est.79
The Supreme Court has explicitly upheld judicial bypass proce-
dures that allow a minor to bypass a notice requirement either be-
cause she is mature or because she can demonstrate that it would be
in her best interest not to notify her parents about her abortion.80
However, the Court has yet to decide whether a notice statute must
contain such a bypass, and some states have statutes that do not con-
tain a procedure requiring judges to grant a bypass even if the ma-
turity and “best interest” tests are met.81
3. Other Statutes and Their Effects on Minors. States have also
enacted other regulations. Courts have found several of these to
violate the “undue burden” standard articulated by Casey.82 However,
the various circuit courts do not always agree with one another as to
what types of regulations constitute an undue burden. This
disagreement is understandable, both because Casey contains no
explicit definition of what amounts to a “substantial” obstacle, and
because differences in interpreting facts often lead to differences of
Statutes: Filling the Gap in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 437,
455-65 (1998) (arguing that the Bellotti judicial bypass requirement should also apply to notice
statutes).
77. Compare Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1463 (8th Cir.
1995) (holding that a parental notification provision that did not include a bypass provision for
mature minors was “unconstitutional on its face”), with Planned Parenthood v. Camblos, 155
F.3d 352, 374 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding that a notification statute that failed to contain a manda-
tory judicial bypass for mature minors was not facially invalid).
78. See Miller, 63 F.3d at 1463; see also Friedman, supra note 76, at 455-65 (arguing that
the “undue burden” standard requires notice statutes to contain judicial bypass procedures).
79. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979) (plurality). But see Camblos, 155 F.3d
at 381 (holding that a statute giving a judge discretion to deny a bypass to a minor is constitu-
tional, despite the constitutional right announced in Bellotti).
80. See Lambert, 520 U.S. at 297-99.
81. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(V) (Michie 1999); Parental Notice of Abortion
Act, § 1, 1999 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 99-322, (West) (to be codified at FLA. STAT. Ch. 390.01115).
82. See infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
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judicial opinion in close cases.83 The Supreme Court has yet to settle
these disputes, as it has not given a precise definition of what
constitutes a “substantial obstacle.”84
For the purposes of this Note, the most important types of regu-
lations are statutes, passed in several jurisdictions, imposing criminal
liability on doctors who perform abortions on minor patients who
have not obtained valid parental consent.85 Such statutes, similar to
the North Carolina statute at issue in Jackson,86 have yet to become
the subject of litigation in many jurisdictions.87
Some of these statutes, like the one from North Carolina, do not
elucidate what, if any, mens rea is required for an abortion provider
to be held criminally liable.88 Statutes that expressly call for strict li-
83. Indeed, even the Justices who agreed that the “undue burden” standard was the ap-
propriate test for constitutionality could not agree on whether Pennsylvania’s 24-hour waiting
requirement constituted an undue burden. Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter held that it
was not. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887 (1991) (joint opinion of
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). Justice Stevens thought that it was. See id. at 921 (Stev-
ens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun, applying strict scrutiny,
also thought the waiting requirement was unconstitutional. See id. at 937 (Blackmun, J., con-
curring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
84. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
85. Other examples of abortion regulations include waiting periods, see, e.g., KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 65-6709 (Supp. 1998), and the issuance of literature outlining alternatives to abortion,
see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 390.0111(3)(a)(2)(b) (1998).
86. See supra note 6.
87. Only Louisiana, South Dakota, and North Carolina statutes have been the subject of
such litigation. See supra note 11. Other existing statutes might also prompt lawsuits. For ex-
ample, in New Mexico it is a felony to use “any method or means whereby an untimely termi-
nation of . . . [a] pregnancy is produced, or attempted to be produced, with the intent to destroy
the fetus” where “the termination is not a justified medical termination.” N.M. STAT. ANN. §
30-5-3 (emphasis added). Justified medical termination is defined as “the intentional ending of
the pregnancy of a woman at the request of said woman or if said woman is under the age of
eighteen years, then at the request of said woman and her then living parent or guardian, by a
physician . . . .” Id. § 30-5-1 (emphasis added). Thus, based on this statutory definition, a physi-
cian performing an abortion on a minor who has not obtained parental consent will not be per-
forming a “justified medical termination” and will be committing a felony. Because the New
Mexico statute contains no judicial bypass, however, it has never been enforced by the New
Mexico Attorney General. See N.M. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 90-19, at 5-7 (1990). Despite its cur-
rent dormancy as a prosecutorial weapon, a private person might still invoke the criminal stat-
ute in a tort action.
88. For example, the above-mentioned New Mexico statute requires that a person have
intent with respect to destroying the fetus. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-3. However, it does not
indicate that a person must intend to be acting in a manner that does not constitute a justified
medical procedure. Indeed, with respect to the exception for a person performing a justified
medical procedure, the statute does not even indicate that a violator must have knowledge or
any other mental state. Similarly, the Louisiana statute invalidated by Okpalobi v. Foster had
no explicit mental state requirement. See Okpalobi v. Foster, 981 F. Supp. 977, 979 (E.D. La.
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ability have been deemed unconstitutional by two courts because of
their potential chilling effects. The Eighth Circuit, in Planned Parent-
hood v. Miller,89 struck a strict liability provision of a South Dakota
statute because the statute’s “chilling effect” “create[d] a substantial
obstacle to a woman’s right to have a pre-viability abortion . . . .”90
Similarly, a district court in Louisiana approved the reasoning of
Miller in striking a portion of a Louisiana statute that appeared to
impose strict liability on abortion providers.91
Moreover, a provision of one of these statutes that created a
state tort action against abortion providers, but did not clearly state
what mens rea would result in liability, was also found unconstitu-
tional because of its chilling effect.92 In Jackson, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals agreed that interpreting the North Carolina statute
to impose strict liability would at least raise a serious constitutional
question, and the court thus avoided the interpretation.93
As Part III will show, statutes akin to the North Carolina statute,
but which explicitly create strict liability, should indeed be held un-
constitutional under Casey.94 Before analyzing these statutes using the
Casey test, however, this test must first be established as the proper
one.
II. WHY CASEY IS THE APPROPRIATE TEST FOR EVALUATING
ABORTION REGULATIONS AFFECTING MINORS
Though it might seem obvious that Casey is the proper basis for
analyzing all statutes impinging the right to abortion, some disagree-
ment on this question has prompted debate among the lower courts.95
1998), aff’d 190 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999).
89. 63 F.3d 1452 (8th Cir. 1995).
90. Id. at 1465 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
91. See Okpalobi, 981 F. Supp. at 986.
92. See id. at 984 (holding that a statute that would have the effect of preventing abortion
providers from performing abortions would “unconstitutionally prevent abortion providers
from exercising their chosen profession” and that “[s]uch a reduction of abortion providers . . .
would also place an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose”).
93. See Jackson ex rel. Robinson v. A Woman’s Choice, Inc., 503 S.E.2d 422, 425-26 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1998) (“[E]ven if . . . [the] construction [of strict liability] was reasonable, our own Su-
preme Court has instructed that where a statute is subject to two constructions, one of which
would raise a serious constitutional question, the court should adopt the construction which
avoids the constitutional problem.”).
94. See infra Part III.
95. See Ruth Burdick, Note, The Casey Undue Burden Standard: Problems Predicted and
Encountered, and the Split over the Salerno Test, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 825 passim (1996).
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Before Casey was decided, the Court had adopted a general test for
facial constitutional challenges in United States v. Salerno,96 which Ca-
sey did not explicitly overrule. However, Casey implicitly replaced
the Salerno test with the “undue burden” standard in the abortion
context by its application of that standard.97 Thus, as discussed below,
the abortion-specific Casey test, rather than the more general Salerno
test, should be used to analyze the constitutionality of abortion
regulations.
Moreover, Casey, rather than Bellotti, is the proper starting point
in analyzing even those abortion statutes specifically regulating mi-
nors. Because Bellotti dealt specifically with the constitutionality of a
parental consent statute, it is sometimes used by the lower courts as a
starting point in analyzing all statutes regulating a minor’s right to
choose abortion.98 Although Bellotti still represents the standard
courts should use to analyze judicial bypass provisions, Casey is the
proper place to begin constitutional analysis of any abortion regula-
tion.99 As I will discuss later, this is so because Bellotti can be read as
an articulation of the “undue burden” standard in one specific con-
text.100
A. The Casey Test Versus the Salerno Test
Although a majority of the Court in Casey affirmed the right to
an abortion, one circuit—the Fifth—has refused to implement the
96. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). Prior to Casey, the Court applied the Salerno test in evaluating
facial challenges to abortion regulations. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 182-84 (1991); see
also Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 524 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring).
97. Casey states that a statute is unconstitutional if it operates as a substantial obstacle “in
a large fraction of the cases in which [it] is relevant.” Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 895 (1992) (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). If the general test for
facial challenges established in Salerno had been the appropriate test, the Court would have
had to hold that a statute is invalid only if “no set of circumstances exists under which [it] would
be valid.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745.
98. See, e.g., Wicklund v. Salvagni, 93 F.3d 567, 571-72 (9th Cir. 1996) (evaluating a paren-
tal notification requirement under Bellotti), rev’d sub. nom Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292,
294-97 (1997) (per curiam).
99. Indeed, at least one court has even used the Casey “undue burden” standard to evalu-
ate a parental consent provision exactly like the one at issue in Bellotti itself. See Planned Par-
enthood v. Lawall, 180 F.3d 1022, 1025-27 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that Casey, rather than
Salerno, is the proper test to use in evaluating the facial constitutionality of abortion regula-
tions and applying that standard to Arizona’s parental consent statute).
100. See infra Part II.B.
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“undue burden” test it set forth.101 Judges refusing to use the Casey
test employ instead the test set forth in Salerno, a test that makes
statutes much harder to invalidate.
In Salerno, the Supreme Court refused to find that the Bail Re-
form Act, which authorized pretrial detention on the basis of future
dangerousness, violated the Eight Amendment.102 In so holding, the
Court stated a very strict test for facial constitutional challenges: “A
facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish
that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid.”103
Even the Salerno Court acknowledges exceptions to this general
rule, however. In fact, the next sentence of the opinion notes that a
different test applies in First Amendment analysis.104 Furthermore,
after Casey, Salerno no longer applies in the abortion context ei-
ther.105 Chief Justice Rehnquist points out, in dissenting to Casey’s
101. See Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12, 14 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (applying the
Salerno “no circumstances” test and citing only to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Casey as
support for its holding); see also Manning v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254, 260, 268 n.4 (4th Cir. 1997)
(noting that “since Roe, no one standard of review has secured a solid majority of the Court,”
even while refusing to hold explicitly that Salerno survives Casey in the abortion context).
However, the prevailing view among the circuits that have considered the question is
that Casey is the proper standard to use, and most facial challenges to statutes regulating abor-
tion are evaluated under the “undue burden” standard. See, e.g., Lawall, 180 F.3d at 1025-27;
Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 195-96 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 1347 (1998); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112, 1116 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520
U.S. 1274 (1997); Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1456-58 (8th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1174 (1996); Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 14 F.3d 848, 863
n.21 (3d Cir. 1994), stay denied, 510 U.S. 1309 (1994); see also Michael C. Dorf, Facial Chal-
lenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 238 (1994) (arguing that the Salerno
“test” is merely dicta that should not be followed because it inaccurately states how the Su-
preme Court has historically approached facial challenges to statutes); cf. Causeway Med. Suite
v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096, 1104 n.6 (5th Cir. 1997) (recognizing explicitly that Barnes’s refusal to
supplant the Salerno test with Casey is questionable, but refusing to address the issue of
whether Barnes’s holding was wrong when it could decide Ieyoub without having to consider
the question).
102. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 741.
103. Id. at 745 (emphasis added).
104. See id. (“[W]e have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited con-
text of the First Amendment.”).
105. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874, 876 (1992) (joint opinion of
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (endorsing “undue burden” as the proper test, rather
than the “no circumstances” Salerno test); see also City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849,
1858 n.22 (1999) (emphasizing that the Salerno “no circumstances” test “has never been the
decisive factor in any decision of this Court, including Salerno itself”); Dorf, supra note 101, at
272 (arguing that the Salerno test has no historical basis in Supreme Court precedent and that
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announcement of the “undue burden” standard, that the Pennsylva-
nia notification statute held unconstitutional by a majority of the
Court would have been upheld under Salerno’s strict “no circum-
stances” test.106
Had Salerno been the proper test, the Court would have had to
uphold the spousal notification requirement as facially valid. The Ca-
sey Court refused to do so. Instead, Casey clearly articulates the ap-
propriate standard for evaluating statutes that might restrict a
woman’s right to choose abortion. The test the Casey Court sets out
while analyzing the spousal notification provision is whether “in a
large fraction of the cases in which [the provision] is relevant, it will
operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice to undergo an
abortion.”107 The Casey joint opinion explicitly acknowledges that the
unconstitutional spousal notification provision of the Pennsylvania
statute was an obstacle not only in some circumstances, but in most.108
Thus, the proper test for facial challenges to abortion statutes
shifts the focus to the opposite extreme of Salerno. Unlike Salerno, in
which a challenger had to prove a negative, showing “no set of cir-
cumstances” in which the restriction would be unconstitutional, un-
der Casey, a successful challenger of an abortion statute need only
look to the group, possibly very small, “for whom the law is a restric-
tion, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.”109 Among this
group, only a “large fraction” need face a substantial obstacle for the
statute to be facially unconstitutional.110 Thus, an abortion provision,
like the spousal notification provision in Casey, may be facially inva-
lid in cases where it would effect an unconstitutional infringement
less than one percent of the time.
Despite the fact that Casey clearly did not use the Salerno stan-
dard, the Fifth Circuit continued to use this general test to evaluate
facial challenges to abortion statutes.111 In one 1992 case, plaintiffs at-
tempted a facial constitutional challenge to a Mississippi statute that
facial challenges to abortion statutes have often been held to a much more lenient test).
106. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 972-73 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (asserting that Salerno’s “no circumstances” test should have led to a different result).
107. Id. at 895.
108. See id. at 894.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 895.
111. See Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12, 14 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); see also Causeway
Med. Suite v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096, 1104 n.6 (5th Cir. 1997) (refusing to overrule Barnes’s use
of the Salerno test rather than the Casey standard in the abortion context).
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mandated physician disclosure of all possible risks to abortion pa-
tients and a twenty-four-hour waiting period between such disclosure
and the abortion itself. Interestingly, the court found the statute fa-
cially constitutional “[p]ursuant to Planned Parenthood of Southeast-
ern Pennsylvania v. Casey . . . .”112 Yet, instead of evaluating the stat-
ute under the Casey undue burden standard, the opinion stated that
“[b]ecause the plaintiffs are challenging the facial validity of the Mis-
sissippi Act, they must ‘establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid.’”113 Indeed, though purporting to
find the Act unconstitutional under Casey, the opinion actually at-
tributes its constitutional test to Salerno and to Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s dissent in Casey.114 Only in a footnote does the court ac-
knowledge that Casey itself applied a different standard: “The Casey
joint opinion may have applied a somewhat different standard in
striking down the spousal notification provision of the Pennsylvania
Act . . . . Nevertheless, we do not interpret Casey as having overruled
[Salerno] . . . .”115
Because the Salerno test is inconsistent with Casey, other circuits
have not followed the Fifth.116 Indeed, one commentator has noted
that after Barnes, “the arguments . . . support[ing] . . . the position
that Casey overruled Salerno in facial challenges of state abortion
regulation . . . [became] more elaborate and persuasive.”117 Indeed,
the arguments of Barnes and other courts in favor of Salerno “ring[]
flat and unconvincing.”118 Even the Fifth Circuit has subsequently in-
dicated that Barnes’s use of the Salerno test was very likely wrong.119
However, courts in the Fifth Circuit have continued to adhere to
112. Barnes, 970 F.2d at 13.
113. Id. at 14 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) and citing Casey,
505 U.S. at 973 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)).
114. See id.
115. Id. at 14 n.2. (citations omitted).
116. See, e.g., Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 14 F.3d 848, 863 n.21 (3d Cir. 1994) (acknowl-
edging that the Supreme Court opinion in Casey provides a new standard for facial challenges
to abortion regulations), stay denied, 510 U.S. 1309 (1994); see also Planned Parenthood, Sioux
Falls Clinic v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1458 (8th Cir. 1995) (same), cert denied, 517 U.S. 1174
(1996).
117. Burdick, supra note 95, at 875.
118. Id.
119. See Causeway Med. Suite v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096, 1104 n.6 (5th Cir. 1997) (acknowl-
edging Justice Stevens’s doubt that, “given intervening statements by Members of [the Su-
preme] Court, . . . subsequent Fifth Circuit panels would follow Barnes’ application of the ‘no
circumstance’ test . . . .”) (quoting Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 517 U.S.
1174, 1176 n.2 (1996) (Stevens, J., mem. respecting denial of certiorari)).
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Salerno—at least in theory.120 The Casey Court’s failure explicitly to
reject the Salerno framework in the abortion context has thus al-
lowed some lower courts to uphold abortion regulations that would
be unconstitutional under the proper standard, without forcing those
courts to challenge directly the Supreme Court’s abortion jurispru-
dence.121
Because of Barnes, several members of the Court have gone out
of their way to confirm that Casey, rather than Salerno, is the proper
test for facial challenges to abortion statutes. For example, Justice
O’Connor has specifically stated that Casey provides the proper test
for determining facial constitutionality:
In striking down Pennsylvania’s spousal-notice provision [in Casey],
we did not require petitioners to show that the provision would be
invalid in all circumstances. Rather, we made clear that a law re-
stricting abortions constitutes an undue burden . . . if, “in a large
fraction of the cases in which [the law] is relevant, it will operate as a
substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice to undergo an abortion.”122
Justice Stevens has also stated that the Salerno test is an improper
standard in the abortion area, as well as an improper standard gener-
ally: “[T]he dicta in Salerno ‘does not accurately characterize the
standard for deciding facial challenges . . . .’ For [this reason],
Salerno’s rigid and unwise dictum has been properly ignored in sub-
120. Not all district courts in the Fifth Circuit have agreed with Barnes. See, e.g., Okpalobi
v. Foster, 981 F. Supp. 977, 981 (E.D. La. 1998), aff’d 190 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting the
possible misapplication of the Salerno standard after Casey); Causeway Med. Suite v. Ieyoub,
905 F. Supp. 360, 363 n.2 (E.D. La. 1995) (same). Moreover, most of the district court decisions
applying the Casey test have been affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, even though it purported to do
so on different grounds. See, e.g., Ieyoub, 109 F.3d at 1104.
121. Arguably the Barnes court was craftily refusing to follow Supreme Court precedent by
claiming to invalidate the Mississippi Act under Casey, while at the same time refusing to apply
its “undue burden” standard. Indeed, it is hard to believe that the court claims to be following
Casey when it cites only to a dissenting opinion in the case and makes clear in a footnote that it
will not interpret Casey to be saying what it actually says. See Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12, 14
n.2 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (“The Casey joint opinion may have applied a somewhat dif-
ferent standard [than this opinion is applying] . . . . Nevertheless, we do not interpret Casey as
having overruled, sub silentio, longstanding Supreme Court precedent governing challenges to
the facial constitutionality of statutes.”).
122. Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013, 1014 (1993) (O’Connor, J.,
joined by Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895
(1992) (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)). But see Ada v. Guam Soc’y of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011, 1012-13 (1992) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., and White, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari because the lower federal court had
applied Casey rather than Salerno in holding an abortion statute unconstitutional on its face).
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sequent cases even outside the abortion context.”123 Moreover, in a
very recent opinion for the Court, Justice Stevens again rejected the
Salerno test, stating that “[t]o the extent we have consistently articu-
lated a clear standard for facial challenges, it is not the Salerno for-
mulation, which has never been the decisive factor in any decision of
this Court, including Salerno itself . . . .”124
The fact that Salerno was not explicitly overruled in Casey—
which is perhaps the only argument in favor of using Salerno to
analyze abortion statutes125—does not overcome the fact that the
“undue burden” test did in fact replace the “no circumstances”
standard in Casey itself, which remains controlling precedent. Not
only did the Casey test represent a baseline point of agreement by the
Court at the time it was articulated,126 it has also been confirmed as
the appropriate test in subsequent opinions. It is therefore the proper
test to use in evaluating abortion statutes.
B. The Casey Test Versus the Bellotti Test
The Casey test is also the proper one to use when evaluating
abortion-related statutes that specifically regulate minors. Although
the Casey Court used the “undue burden” test to evaluate all of the
provisions of the Pennsylvania statute, including those affecting only
minors,127 lower federal courts often evaluate such laws by looking to
Bellotti v. Baird.128 However, because the Bellotti opinion is narrowly
focused on judicial bypass requirements of a parental consent statute,
123. Janklow, 517 U.S. at 1175 (Stevens, J., mem. respecting denial of certiorari) (quoting
Dorf, supra note 101, at 236). But see id. at 1178 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehquist, C.J., and Tho-
mas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari and arguing that Salerno represents “a long es-
tablished principle of our jurisprudence”).
Professor Michael Dorf argues that the Salerno test is a bad one because all persons have
the right to be judged by a valid rule of law, a right that would be infringed by the use of
Salerno to evaluate a law’s constitutionality. See Dorf, supra note 101, at 242-51. Moreover,
Professor Dorf maintains that the test is not an accurate reflection of Supreme Court jurispru-
dence, since the “overbreadth” doctrine has been applied in several contexts outside of the
First Amendment area, including cases involving the right to an abortion. See id. at 272.
124. City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1858 n.22 (1999).
125. See Burdick, supra note 95, at 875.
126. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
127. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899-900 (1992) (joint opinion of
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (evaluating a parental consent requirement using the
“undue burden” standard).
128. 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality). For a brief discussion of lower federal courts use of the
Bellotti test, see supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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it provides a concrete framework of analysis only for that particular
type of statute, not a useful general test for other types of regulations.
In analyzing a regulation affecting only minors, one should begin
by looking to Casey, using Bellotti only as a supplement if the specific
statute in question is one that can be evaluated using the Bellotti
standard. That Bellotti should be used in conjunction with Casey is
clear from the language of the Bellotti opinion itself. Justice Powell’s
plurality opinion in Bellotti not only presaged the general upholding
of abortion regulation by the states but also relied on the same “un-
due burden” standard later employed and made famous by Casey:
Justice Powell states that a minor’s “constitutional right to seek an
abortion may not be unduly burdened by state-imposed condi-
tions . . . .”129 However, if state regulations do not amount to an undue
burden, then, like a consent statute with an appropriate judicial by-
pass procedure, they are not an impermissible infringement on the
minor’s right to choose abortion.130
While making clear that the statute at issue was an undue bur-
den, Bellotti does not suggest what other types of statutes and regula-
tions could also be considered an undue burden.131 Thus, Bellotti is
useful after Casey merely as a specific application of it. To determine
whether a regulation is an undue burden on a minor’s right to choose
abortion, one should therefore use the Casey explanation of the “un-
due burden” standard.
III. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF POTENTIAL LIABILITY
Because of several recent lawsuits similar to Jackson ex rel.
Robinson v. A Woman’s Choice, Inc.,132 abortion providers have good
reason to be concerned about stumbling unwittingly into civil or
criminal liability.133 Perhaps because the focus of the recent litigation
129. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 648 (emphasis added).
130. See id. at 647.
131. Simply put, Justice Powell defines certain types of statutes as an undue burden per se.
That is, a minor’s right to obtain an abortion is unduly burdened by a parental consent re-
quirement if the requirement does not contain a judicial bypass option that will allow a mature
minor to make the abortion decision herself, and an immature minor to obtain an abortion that
is in her best interest. See id. However, Bellotti does not indicate what other types of statutes
and regulations would also be an undue burden. Thus, to determine whether a regulation is an
undue burden on a minor’s right to choose abortion, one should use the Casey explanation of
the “undue burden” standard, keeping in mind that after Bellotti a state may be able to justify
regulations by its interest in protecting immature decisionmakers from themselves.
132. 503 S.E.2d 422 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
133. In addition to Jackson, other recent litigants have attempted to make abortion provid-
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has been on abortion providers rather than on abortion patients, not
enough attention is paid to the ultimate effect such liability will have
on minor patients. By deterring many or most providers from per-
forming abortions on minors, such liability has the potential to elimi-
nate, or to burden severely, the ability of minors to obtain abortions.
Once Casey is accepted as the proper test, it is easy to see that
laws establishing this kind of potential criminal liability of abortion
providers should be invalidated. The reasons for finding such statutes
unconstitutional are the same as those given by courts that have in-
validated “partial-birth” abortion statutes. Abortion providers in
both cases will be fearful of portentous liability they cannot control,
and hence less willing to provide abortions.134 Arguably, the threat of
liability is an unconstitutional undue burden on the right of minors to
obtain elective abortions because of the chilling effect such liability
will have on abortion providers.
A. One Application of Casey: The “Partial-Birth” Abortion Cases
Accepting Casey as the proper test, it is not difficult to conclude
that a law having a chilling effect on abortion providers is unconstitu-
tional, since a law that effectively eliminates abortion providers
would be the most “substantial obstacle” possible for a woman seek-
ing an abortion. Indeed, nearly all courts that have considered the
question have held that a law serving to dissuade abortion providers
from performing abortions is unconstitutional under the “undue bur-
den” test described in Casey.135 The recent decisions holding “partial-
birth” abortion statutes to be unconstitutional are the best example.
ers liable despite their good-faith efforts to comply with the law. See, e.g., Boykin v. Magnolia
Bay, Inc., 570 So. 2d 639, 641-42 (Ala. 1990) (ruling that the minor was in pari delicto because
she had lied about her age to the abortion clinic, and was thus not permitted to recover dam-
ages); see also Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1467 (8th Cir.
1995) (reasoning that the threat of civil liability “is more than enough to chill the willingness of
physicians to perform abortions in South Dakota”); Okpalobi v. Foster, 981 F. Supp. 977, 986
(E.D. La. 1998), aff’d 190 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding the same unconstitutional chilling
effect from a Louisiana statute); supra notes 87-88 (discussing the potential criminal liability of
abortion providers under a New Mexico criminal statute).
134. See infra Part III.B.
135. See, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 396 (1979) (holding that statutes creating
uncertainty as to what actions of an abortion provider might create liability are unconstitutional
because of their “profound chilling effect on the willingness of physicians to perform abor-
tions”). The question has come up more recently in the “partial-birth” abortion context and
with statutes that create strict liability for abortion providers. See infra notes 141, 159 and ac-
companying text.
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A number of jurisdictions have recently passed statutes pur-
porting to ban a procedure popularly dubbed “partial-birth abor-
tion.” However, exactly what procedures are being outlawed under
these statutes is decidedly unclear. As one district court judge noted,
“The term ‘partial-birth abortion’ is a term coined by legislators, anti-
abortion activists, and the media. It has no accepted medical mean-
ing.”136 The states that have passed “partial-birth” abortion statutes
have argued that the laws merely ban a procedure known as a D & X,
a rarely performed procedure in which “the physician may grasp the
fetus by the feet or legs and draw the fetus intact through the cervix
into the vagina where the fetal head may get stuck.”137 If this occurs,
“the physician [may] . . . collapse the fetal head in order that the fetus
may be delivered intact.”138 However, a typical statute says nothing
about the D & X procedure, but bans all “abortion[s] in which the
person performing the abortion partially vaginally delivers a living
human fetus before killing the fetus and completing the delivery.”139
This language is broad enough to include all of the most common
abortion procedures.140
All of the district courts that have considered the constitutional-
ity of “partial-birth” abortion statutes have found them likely to be
unconstitutionally vague, as well as an unconstitutional infringement
on a woman’s right to abortion under the Casey “undue burden”
test.141 To date, only one circuit court has decided a “partial-birth”
136. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d 795, 799 (E.D. Va.), rev’d,
144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998) (Luttig, J., granting stay).
137. Planned Parenthood v. Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d 478, 484 (D.N.J. 1998).
138. Id.
139. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-6(e) (West Supp. 1999) (enjoined by Verniero, 41 F. Supp.
2d at 504-05).
140. See Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 491 (noting, for example, that the phrase “partially
vaginally delivers” could reasonably be interpreted to include any abortion in which a fetal part
is delivered into the vagina, a phenomenon that has the potential to occur in nearly every abor-
tion procedure).
141. See Causeway Med. Suite v. Foster, 43 F. Supp. 2d 604, 612-13, 615-19 (E.D. La. 1999);
Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 504; Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1131-32 (D. Neb.
1998); Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 819, 825; Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 1 F. Supp. 2d 958,
962-64 (S.D. Iowa 1998); Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 995 F. Supp. 847, 853-60 (N.D. Ill. 1998); A
Choice for Women v. Butterworth, No. 98-0774, 1998 WL 1070946, at *5-*10 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 2,
1998); Planned Parenthood v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369, 1376-79 (D. Ariz. 1997); Evans v.
Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283, 1304-11, 1315-18 (E.D. Mich. 1997); see also Little Rock Family
Planning Servs., P.A. v. Jegley, No. 97-581, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22325, at *86 (E.D. Ark. Nov.
13, 1998) (finding a “partial-birth” abortion statute unconstitutional for three reasons: “it is
unacceptably vague, it imposes an undue burden on women seeking abortions, and it does not
adequately protect the health and lives of pregnant women”).
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abortion case, agreeing with the district courts.142 Thus, the federal
courts overwhelmingly agree that “partial-birth” abortion statutes
are unconstitutional.143
A recent district court decision, Planned Parenthood v.
Verniero,144 provides an example of the reasoning employed by the
many courts that have found “partial-birth” abortion statutes to be
unconstitutional. The opinion outlines the various types of abortion
procedures commonly performed by abortion providers in order to
demonstrate why the language of the statutes might be read to ban
many or most types of abortion procedures.145 The Verniero court
notes also that it has received a number of affidavits from abortion
providers who state that the threat of liability would force them to
stop providing abortions if the “partial-birth” abortion statute were
to become effective.146 The court ultimately enjoins the statute on two
related grounds: first, it finds the statute to be unconstitutionally
vague; and second, it finds the vagueness of the statute creates an un-
due burden because of its potential chilling effect on abortion pro-
viders.147
The court finds several provisions of the Act to be vague. First,
“those subject to the penalties of the Act cannot, with any certainty,
determine what conduct is prohibited.”148 This renders the Act uncon-
stitutional, because the “lack of precision . . . leaves the Act open to
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”149 Moreover, the court
links this vagueness holding to its later determination that the statute
142. See Doyle, 162 F.3d at 471 (reversing the district court and ordering it to enter a pre-
liminary injunction enjoining Wisconsin’s “partial-birth” abortion statute). But see Richmond
Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326, 332 (4th Cir. 1998) (Luttig, J., granting stay)
(disagreeing with the district court’s decision to grant an injunction and staying that injunction
on the grounds that the plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not perform the pro-
cedure banned under the “partial-birth” abortion statute and thus lacked a reasonable fear of
prosecution), motion to vacate denied, 183 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998).
143. The only currently valid opinion that did not hold a “partial-birth” statute to be uncon-
stitutional on its face is Gilmore, 144 F.3d at 332. Even this opinion avoids the question of
whether deterring abortion providers would be unconstitutional because it determines that the
plaintiff physicians did not have standing to bring suit. See id. at 328.
144. 41 F. Supp. 2d 478 (D.N.J. 1998).
145. See id. at 483-85. The court eventually concludes that the statute’s imprecise language
may render illegal almost all of the most common and safest abortion procedures. See id. at
493.
146. See id. at 487.
147. See id. at 504.
148. Id. at 493.
149. Id. at 494.
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represents an undue burden by emphasizing that “[a] higher degree
of clarity is required when ‘uncertainty induced by the statute threat-
ens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.’”150
In determining that the Act is likewise an undue burden under
Casey, the court reemphasizes that the statute’s vague, imprecise lan-
guage could reasonably be interpreted as a ban on most conventional
abortion procedures.151 The possibility that the statute might be inter-
preted in this way would create uncertainty for abortion providers as
to whether they must stop performing these conventional abortions
in order to avoid liability.152 Because the statute would engender such
uncertainty regarding potential liability, the court concludes it would
“chill[] physicians from performing most conventional abortion pro-
cedures . . . thereby impos[ing] an undue burden on a woman’s con-
stitutional right to terminate a pregnancy.”153
Other district courts have used similar reasoning in finding that,
even if “partial-birth” abortion statutes do not actually forbid certain
procedures, the belief that they might do so will have an unconstitu-
tional chilling effect.154 As one court explains, “If the plaintiffs chose
to stop offering the D & E procedure to their patients, it would im-
pose an undue burden on the patients’ right to seek an abortion be-
cause it would deprive them of the most common and safest method
of abortion procedure in the second trimester.”155
B. The Unconstitutional Chilling Effect of Potential Liability
Like the “partial-birth” abortion statutes, the recent efforts to
impose liability on abortion providers for failing to ensure that their
minor patients have actually obtained parental consent are unconsti-
tutional under the Casey “undue burden” test. Statutory provisions
150. Id. at 490 (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 391 (1979)).
151. The court had earlier determined that one possible interpretation of the statute was
that it banned all abortion procedures except hysterotomies and hysterectomies. See id. at 499;
supra notes 139-40, 145-46.
152. See Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 490.
153. Id. at 499-500.
154. See, e.g., Richmond Med. Ctr. For Women v. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d 795, 825 (E.D.
Va.) (noting that, under the statute, doctors “would have to choose between a cessation of per-
forming [conventional abortions] or potential prosecution under the Act”), rev’d on other
grounds, 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998) (Luttig, J., granting stay); Planned Parenthood v. Woods,
982 F. Supp. 1369, 1377-78 (D. Ariz. 1997) (explaining that, if the statute were to go into effect,
“physicians would fear prosecution and civil liability when performing any [conventional abor-
tion],” with the likely result that such procedures would no longer be available).
155. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 825.
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that could be construed as creating strict liability have already been
held to be “likely”156 unconstitutional in several jurisdictions.157 Al-
though no case has yet been brought respecting a statute with a neg-
ligence standard, such statutes should be held unconstitutional as
well.158
1. Strict liability. Statutes imposing strict liability on abortion
providers would create a deterrent nearly identical to the one found
unconstitutional by the courts that have decided the “partial-birth”
abortion cases. Indeed, most of the courts that have considered the
constitutionality of such statutes have agreed that strict liability
would chill the willingness of abortion providers to perform
abortions, an effect which renders the statutes unconstitutional.159
Strict liability is likely to have this effect because abortion pro-
viders facing such liability can never be sure that they are shielded
from liability until they cease performing abortions on minors. Just as
the recent “partial-birth” abortion statutes create uncertainty as to
whether certain types of common procedures are illegal, abortion
providers will never be certain whether they have incurred liability
under a strict liability statute, since abortion providers could be held
liable for unconscious or unwitting violations of the law.160 Abortion
providers would therefore be unable to protect themselves from
many different types of situations—for example, a minor who has ex-
ceptionally convincing fake identification, or who brings with her
someone posing as a parent. In fact, abortion providers will only be
able to avoid liability by refusing to perform abortions on all prospec-
tive patients who appear as if they could be under eighteen.161
156. Courts construing statutes will find them likely unconstitutional because they are fol-
lowing a canon of statutory construction that forces courts to interpret statutes so as to avoid
potential (or likely) constitutional problems. See, e.g., Jackson ex rel. Robinson v. A Woman’s
Choice, Inc., 503 S.E.2d 422, 425-26 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
157. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
158. This is so at least to the extent that such a statute does not contain an exemption for an
abortion provider who has obtained an apparently valid consent form from the minor before
the abortion is performed. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1467 (8th Cir.
1995); Okpalobi v. Foster, 981 F. Supp. 977, 986 (E.D. La. 1998), aff’d 190 F.3d 337 (5th Cir.
1999); Jackson, 503 S.E.2d at 425.
160. For example, if the North Carolina statute were interpreted as a strict liability statute,
Jackson’s doctor would have been held liable for having performed the abortion despite having
attempted to comply with all the legal requirements.
161. This might mean that women much older than 18 would be turned away, since abor-
tion providers might be fearful of misidentifying an especially mature-looking minor as an
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This potential unwillingness on the part of abortion providers is
the most “undue” of any burden a woman seeking an abortion might
face. An inability to find a doctor willing to perform an abortion will
be not only a “substantial” obstacle, but an unconquerable one. And
statutes that evoke uncertainty as to what acts performed by an abor-
tion provider might generate liability are acknowledged by courts to
“have a profound chilling effect on the willingness of physicians to
perform abortions . . . .”162
Moreover, a response other than an outright refusal to perform
abortions on minors may also create an undue burden. Any abortion
provider who is willing to continue performing abortions on minors
in the face of a strict liability statute might decide to safeguard her-
self against liability by implementing procedures designed to elimi-
nate as much fraud as possible. For example, an abortion provider
could implement a policy of performing abortions only when the par-
ent’s signature has been notarized, or when the parent actually ac-
companies the minor and signs the permission slip in the doctor’s
presence. These types of restrictions, however, might protect physi-
cians at the expense of many of their minor patients. Such restrictions
could themselves work an undue burden on the class for whom they
are relevant.
A notarization requirement, for example, implicates privacy in-
terests. A parent might be willing to consent to the abortion, but un-
willing to share the fact of the abortion or his consent to the abortion
with a notary. Further, rural teenagers might have more difficulty in
convincing a parent to consent when that consent also entails a long
drive to a notary’s office.
Convincing a parent to accompany his minor daughter to the
abortion clinic might prove no easier for the minor. One can easily
imagine that minors who have the most attenuated relationships with
their parents—and the hardest time getting parental consent in the
first place—might find it difficult or impossible to convince a con-
senting parent to take the time to come with them to an abortion
clinic.163 This would be a particular problem for teenagers in rural ar-
eas who live far away from a clinic.164 Thus, responses to strict liability
adult.
162. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 396 (1979).
163. In some cases, there might also be financial implications. A parent in a poor family, for
instance, might be unable to afford both the cost of the abortion and the time spent away from
work.
164. In fact, finding and getting to an abortion provider is often difficult enough in itself.
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that are less restrictive than a complete refusal to provide abortions
to minors might also create substantial obstacles for minors.
2. Negligence. Whether standards of culpability other than strict
liability might also be unconstitutional has not yet been considered
by the courts. Most of the statutes applying liability do not state any
mens rea requirement, and many have been either struck down as
unconstitutional because of the potential for strict liability165 or
interpreted as not imposing strict liability because of the probable
unconstitutionality of such a construction.166
However, a statute that explicitly imposes a negligence standard
of liability might have the same chilling effect as a strict liability stat-
ute, since the lack of a knowledge or intent requirement means abor-
tion providers would still face liability for unconscious or unwitting
violations of the law. A statutorily imposed duty that a physician ex-
ercise “reasonable” care in policing his minor patients does not give
much more certainty than strict liability—it merely creates a different
type of uncertainty.
Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized in New York Times v.
Sullivan167 that a negligence standard, as well as a strict liability stan-
dard, can have an unconstitutional chilling effect.168 In Sullivan, the
Court held that libel prosecutions require proof of “‘actual malice’—
that is . . . knowledge that [a libelous statement] was false or [made]
with reckless disregard of whether [it] was false or not.”169 A state’s
failure to grant immunity for any standard less than actual malice (in-
cluding a negligence or strict liability standard) creates an impermis-
Eighty-four percent of counties in the United States do not have abortion providers. See THE
NARAL FOUNDATION, WHO DECIDES: A STATE-BY-STATE REVIEW OF ABORTION AND
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS vii (7th ed. 1998) (citing Stanley K. Henshaw & Jennifer Van Vort,
Abortion Services in the United States, 1991 and 1992, FAM. PLAN. PERSP., May/June 1994, at
100, 103). Many women in rural areas are forced to drive hundreds of miles to access an abor-
tion provider. See id. at iv. Moreover, the number of physicians who provide abortions to pa-
tients is shrinking nationwide; both North Dakota and South Dakota have only one abortion
provider each. See id. at vii.
165. See Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1467 (8th Cir.
1995); Okpalobi v. Foster, 981 F. Supp. 977, 986 (E.D. La. 1998), aff’d 190 F.3d 337 (5th Cir.
1999).
166. See Jackson ex rel. Robinson v. A Woman’s Choice, Inc., 503 S.E.2d 422, 426 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1998) (holding that the statute does not impose strict liability, but failing to make clear
exactly to what standard the statute does hold abortion providers).
167. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
 168. See id. at 279-80.
169. Id. at 280.
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sible “threat of damage suits . . . [that would] ‘dampen the ardor of all
but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible . . . .’”170 A higher
standard than negligence is thus required to protect the fundamental
right to speak precisely because a lower standard than actual malice
is presumed to chill speech.
Of course, it is true that First Amendment and abortion rights
are not exactly parallel. The constitutionality of speech regulations is
subjected to a form of scrutiny that may be considered stricter than
the “undue burden” test. Therefore, a standard less exacting than
“actual malice” might be required for abortion-provider liability to
be constitutional. Possibly, recklessness, or even gross negligence,
would suffice. However, given that both speech and abortion are fun-
damental rights, a good argument for “actual malice” could be made,
even though I do not attempt it here.171 Certainly, however, the much
lower standard of negligence would have a chilling effect in the abor-
tion context. First, any credible threat of a lawsuit might be enough
to convince a physician to eliminate only one part of his practice by
ceasing to provide abortion services to minors.172 Moreover, the un-
certain outcome of these potential lawsuits would further “dampen
the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible”
abortion providers.
Like the abortion providers in New Jersey who would have
stopped providing all abortions that might have been covered by the
“partial-birth” abortion ban,173 abortion providers practicing in states
with statutes demanding that doctors police their minor patients—but
not giving strict guidelines for what they must do to avoid liability—
can never know exactly what actions a jury might deem negligent. Ju-
ries hearing the same factual situations might—and are legally al-
lowed to—rule based on a “reasonableness” standard that might le-
170. Id. at 282 (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959)).
171. I argue only that at least the threat of liability for negligence, if not recklessness, cre-
ates too much of a deterrent to satisfy the Casey test.
172. Indeed, extra paperwork appears to have been enough to deter many physicians from
continuing their abortion practice. In the 10-year period immediately preceding the Casey deci-
sion—in which abortion regulations became more prevalent as the Supreme Court began to
show signs it might overrule Roe—the number of abortion providers dropped 18%. See THE
NARAL FOUNDATION, supra note 164, at vii. In the four years following Casey, which opened
the floodgates for state abortion regulations, the number of physicians dropping abortion from
their practice increased dramatically, rising to 85 dropouts per year compared to 51 per year in
the four years prior to Casey, a more than 50% increase in the number of dropouts. See Stanley
K. Henshaw, Abortion Incidence and Services in the United States, 1995-1996, FAM. PLAN.
PERSP., Nov./Dec. 1998, at 263, 267-68.
173. See Planned Parenthood v. Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d 478, 499 (D.N.J. 1998).
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gitimately mean different things to different people, and judges do
not have the ability to overturn jury decisions if the jury’s findings
were within reason.174 Moreover, because of the strong beliefs many
people have about the immorality of abortion, as well as the great
prejudice that may accompany such beliefs, abortion providers would
certainly be rightly concerned with how even their good-faith efforts
might be judged by members of their communities.175
Unlike the malpractice liability doctors face for failure to obtain
informed consent from their patients—standards that have been liti-
gated extensively—doctors facing liability for failure to exercise care
in assuring that a valid parent’s signature has been obtained cannot
know exactly to what standard they will be held. No case law exists
that might help answer this question, and no jury has ever decided
such a case.176
In facing liability for his good-faith efforts to obey the law, Mu-
keshia Jackson’s abortion provider, Dr. Washington, could not have
known—either from looking to the statute (which was silent on the
question of what would be per se reasonable), or from prior decisions
(since none existed)—whether he might be held liable for negligence.
Though he thought that he had fully complied with all legal require-
ments, a judge interpreting a statute imposing liability for negligence
might have ruled that a jury could properly view an abortion provider
as reasonable only in the exercise of extra-vigilant measures to assure
himself that the mother’s signature was not a forgery. Indeed, a jury
might have determined that a physician should assume fraud to be
likely, in which case he would surely not have been acting reasonably
174. See, e.g., United States v. Watkins, 519 F.2d 294, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
175. Widespread violence aimed at clinics and abortion providers demonstrates the ma-
levolent attitude anti-choice citizens have towards doctors who choose to provide abortion
services. In October 1998, Dr. Barnett Slepian was shot by a sniper while in his home. See
David Van Biema, The Shattered Peace, TIME, Nov. 2, 1998, at 78, 78. In the past 15 years,
abortion clinics have been subjected to violent attacks 167 times. See Maggie Haberman, Two
Decades of Terror, N.Y. POST, Oct. 26, 1998, at 18. Between 1993 and 1998, seven people were
killed in clinics in the United States by protestors. See id. The violence against clinics and doc-
tors has become such an enormous problem that many of the same states that have passed re-
strictive abortion regulations have also passed laws “to protect medical personnel . . . against
blockades and violence.” THE NARAL FOUNDATION, supra note 164, at xi. Four state legisla-
tures—California, Michigan, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania—have passed resolutions that
condemn violence aimed at abortion clinics. See id.
176. Nor do doctors generally face liability for failing to obtain parental consent in other
contexts, since the “mature minor” exception shields them from liability in cases where a ma-
ture minor lies about her age. See Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 744-45 (Tenn. 1987);
supra note 11.
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by doing nothing more than accepting an apparently valid note. On
the other hand, for Dr. Washington to believe that a court would rule
that the acceptance of an apparently valid note was per se reasonable
is no less plausible.177 This type of uncertainty might well be as unac-
ceptable to a physician as the uncertainty associated with strict liabil-
ity statutes.
Even if not deterred outright by the vagueness inherent in a
negligence standard, some physicians facing liability for negligence
may try to overcompensate for the uncertainty by establishing ex-
acting proof of a signature’s validity. As discussed above, abortion
providers who implement more vigilant requirements avoid liability
by creating different, yet still substantial, obstacles for many of their
patients.178 Thus, both because the need for certainty is essential
where constitutional rights are involved,179 and because requiring a
doctor to do more than accept a note might lead to other obstacles
for many minors, a constitutional enforcement statute should allow
defendants to assert, as a good-faith defense, that they received from
the minor a permission slip with an apparently valid signature.180
IV. THE CONSEQUENT DIFFICULTIES OF ENFORCING
PARENTAL CONSENT STATUTES
The conclusion that abortion providers cannot be forced to po-
lice their minor patients raises one obvious question: how can fraud
like that perpetrated by Mukeshia Jackson in North Carolina be pre-
vented without enlisting abortion providers to help stop it? Parental
consent statutes could theoretically cease to have any operative ef-
fect.181 However, even though parental consent statutes may lack
177. Taking action in “good faith” often statutorily exempts doctors from liability. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.05(1) (West 1999) (exempting from liability doctors who in “good
faith” prescribe addictive drugs to addicts during the course of professional treatment); GA.
CODE ANN. § 51-1-29 (Michie 1982) (exempting from liability doctors who give emergency
care at an accident scene in “good faith”).
178. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
179. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390-91 (1979).
180. For a model of a statute providing such a good-faith defense for abortion providers,
see Baird v. Attorney Gen., 360 N.E.2d 288, 302 (Mass. 1977).
181. States might be able to reduce fraud by passing statutes requiring minors to have their
parents’ signatures notarized. Louisiana, for example, already requires this. See LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40:1299.35.5(A)(1) (West 1999). While such a requirement might not eliminate all
fraud, it would serve to prevent most.
However, this is perhaps not a viable solution either, since a notarization requirement
might itself be unconstitutional under Casey. Arguably, the class of minors who could obtain
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teeth without complementary statutes requiring abortion providers to
be regulators, the latter statutes are still unconstitutional.
Normally, of course, regulations may lawfully require private
citizens to police minors while providing services not permitted them.
In such cases, even strict liability may be perfectly legitimate. For ex-
ample, dram shop laws hold sellers of alcoholic beverages liable for
selling to underage persons even if the dram shop owner might rea-
sonably have believed the buyer was of age.182 Such laws may result in
overenforcement of the drinking-age laws, such that even persons
well over twenty-one years old may be unable to buy alcoholic bever-
ages if they cannot show proof of age. While this is a perfectly legiti-
mate result in most contexts, the same type of overenforcement has
been deemed impermissible in areas involving fundamental rights.
For instance, although the government is permitted to pass laws
regulating certain types of speech, the First Amendment prohibits
otherwise permissible laws from taking effect when these laws might
have a chilling effect on constitutionally protected speech.183 One ex-
ample is a law that does not actually ban protected speech, but fright-
ens people into believing that it does.
In NAACP v. Button,184 the Supreme Court struck down a Vir-
ginia statute that prohibited any arrangement in which prospective
litigants were advised to seek legal assistance and given legal refer-
rals.185 The Court made clear that its finding had nothing to do with
whether the regulation fell under the state’s police power: the Court
found that Virginia had a valid interest in regulating certain tradi-
tionally illegal practices—specifically, barratry,186 maintenance,187 and
consent but not a notarized signature would, like the class of women burdened by the spousal
notice requirement in Casey, face a “substantial obstacle” from a notarization requirement.
The same problems would arise with a requirement that minors have a parent accompany them
to the abortion clinic. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
182. All states have laws restricting the sale of alcohol to persons under 21 years of age.
Many hold sellers strictly liable for selling to an underage person. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 28-
3A-25(a)(3) (1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 244.080 (Banks-Baldwin 1999); see also Swett v.
Haig’s, Inc., 663 A.2d 930, 931 (Vt. 1995) (holding that Vermont’s Dram Shop Act imposes
strict liability for injuries to third parties on dram shops that serve minors).
183. See, e.g., City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1987); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377
U.S. 360, 372 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 434-37 (1963).
184. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
185. See id. at 444.
186. Barratry is defined as “[t]he offense of frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels and
suits, either at law or otherwise.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 150 (6th ed. 1990).
187. Maintenance is defined as “[a]n officious intermeddling in a lawsuit by a non-party by
maintaining, supporting or assisting either party, with money or otherwise, to prosecute or de-
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champerty188—but nonetheless held “that [the state’s legitimate] in-
terest d[id] not justify the prohibition” imposed by the statute at is-
sue.189
Laws like the one in Button are unconstitutional because “[t]he
threat of sanctions may deter [the] exercise [of rights] almost as
potently as the actual application of sanctions.”190 A law that is a valid
exercise of a state’s police power might still be unconstitutional be-
cause of its potential to impede the exercise of constitutionally pro-
tected rights.
Of course, First Amendment jurisprudence might be distin-
guished on the ground that the unconstitutional statutes directly im-
pede the person holding the fundamental right. Such a distinction,
however, is not as clear as it might seem. In Sullivan, for example, the
speech that was threatened by the libel law was a paid advertisement,
not an article authored by a Times writer. The New York Times might
appropriately be viewed as a third-party “speech provider” analogous
to the third-party abortion providers chilled by consent enforcement
statutes.
Likewise, in Smith v. California,191 the First Amendment
prompted the reversal of a third-party’s conviction under a strict li-
ability statute, even though that particular party’s rights were not im-
plicated.192 In Smith, a proprietor of a bookstore was convicted of
possessing pornographic material under a statute that “included no
element of scienter—knowledge by appellant of the contents of the
book . . . .”193 The Court found strict liability to be unacceptable
where First Amendment rights were involved, finding that the pub-
lic’s First Amendment rights would in general be infringed by the
statute.194 The infringement would occur because booksellers would
naturally be cautious in the face of a strict liability statute and would
fend the litigation.” Id. at 954.
188. Champerty is defined as “[a] bargain between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit by
which the stranger pursues the party’s claim in consideration of receiving part of any judgment
proceeds . . . .” Id. at 231.
189. Button, 371 U.S. at 439.
190. Id. at 433; see also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding
that a public official bringing a libel action against critics of his official conduct must prove “ac-
tual malice,” as any lesser standard of culpability might dampen free expression).
191. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
192. See id. at 155.
193. Id. at 149.
194. See id. at 152.
QUINN TO PRINTER 11/30/99 2:59 PM
1999] MINORS’ RIGHTS AFTER CASEY 333
“tend to restrict the books [they] sell[] . . . .”195 Thus, while the Consti-
tution does not generally forbid states from imposing strict liability
on third-party service providers,196 it specifically does forbid it when
the threat of strict liability will impinge upon other persons’ constitu-
tional rights.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has explicitly found a statute to
be unconstitutional precisely because of that statute’s chilling effect
on third-party abortion providers.197 In Colautti v. Franklin,198 the Su-
preme Court had to determine the constitutionality of a statute that
“subject[ed] a physician who performs an abortion to potential
criminal liability if he fails to utilize a statutorily prescribed technique
when the fetus ‘is viable’ or when there is ‘sufficient reason to believe
that the fetus may be viable.’”199 The Court reaffirmed that “the
State’s interest in the potential life of the fetus reaches the compel-
ling point at the stage of viability.”200 Yet, the Supreme Court also
stated that an otherwise valid statute—indeed one that was enacted
to further a state interest acknowledged to be compelling—cannot be
held constitutional “where the uncertainty induced by the statute
threatens to inhibit the exercise of [otherwise] protected rights,” in
particular the right to an abortion.201 Thus, the Colautti Court explic-
itly brought the “chilling” standard of the First Amendment into the
abortion context, stating that “[t]he prospect of . . . disagreement
[over a statute’s meaning by abortion providers and other medical
experts] . . . could have a profound chilling effect on the willingness of
physicians to perform abortions . . . .”202 This, the Court held, made
what might otherwise have been a valid regulation unconstitutional.203
195. Id. at 153.
196. Indeed, the Smith Court notes that in the case of food distributors, strict liability stat-
utes are permissible as a way of “making the distributors of food the strictest censors of their
merchandise . . . .” Id. at 152.
197. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390-94 (1979). Moreover, other courts have
pointed out that the abortion provider, too, has a constitutional right to pursue his profession, a
right that is unconstitutionally chilled by potential liability. See, e.g., Okpalobi v. Foster, 981 F.
Supp. 977, 986 (E.D. La. 1998), aff’d 190 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The statute has the purpose
and effect of infringing and chilling the exercise of constitutionally protected rights of abortion
providers . . . .”); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (holding that the
right to pursue one’s livelihood is a constitutionally protected right).
198. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
199. Id. at 381.
200. Id. at 386.
201. Id. at 391.
202. Id. at 396 (emphasis added).
203. See id. at 396-97.
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Therefore, the Supreme Court may hold that a state’s police
power extends to the regulation of certain activities and still later
hold statutes regulating those activities impermissible. As discussed
earlier, a chilling effect on the right of minors to abortion is particu-
larly likely in the case of uncertain abortion-provider liability.
Moreover, this chilling effect interferes directly with the exercise of a
fundamental right because abortion providers are essential to a
woman’s ability to obtain an abortion. Thus, some laws regulating
abortion providers—as well as many laws regulating minors—may be
permissible only in theory. State legislatures must walk a fine line to
ensure that regulation does not simultaneously serve as a means of
preventing abortions from occurring. Legislatures that fail to take
into account the chilling effect of regulation ignore the inherent im-
plications of the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence.204 Indeed,
had the Casey record revealed that abortion providers were being de-
terred from performing abortions on minors, the Court would surely
have had to conclude that the statute was unconstitutional. The very
definition the same Court gave for an undue burden is “a state regu-
lation that has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”205
As discussed earlier, the effect of deterring abortion providers consti-
tutes a severe obstacle.
That parental consent statutes may be rendered impotent by a
state’s inability to enlist abortion providers as enforcers is therefore
not inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s view that such statutes are
a valid exercise of a state’s regulatory authority. In Casey, the Su-
preme Court was simply not asked to consider the problems a state
may face in trying to enforce parental consent statutes without the
concurrent ability to compel abortion providers to help it do so.
Finally, one should not assume that consent laws will be ineffec-
tive without a mechanism that could force abortion providers to help
police their patients. To begin with, not all teenagers who obtain
abortions are committing the type of fraud perpetrated by Mukeshia
204. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (joint opinion of
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (stating that “a statute which, while furthering . . .
some . . . valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman’s choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends”); Co-
lautti, 439 U.S. at 394 (noting that the statute in question was unconstitutional insofar as it
“presents serious problems of notice, discriminatory application, and chilling effect on the ex-
ercise of constitutional rights”).
205. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (emphasis added).
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Jackson. While it may be true that the minors who actually obtain pa-
rental consent are the same ones who would have done so without
parental involvement statutes,206 such statutes probably cause some
minors to involve parents who would not have otherwise been in-
formed of the pregnancy. At the very least, an assumption that the
laws have some, even if not full, effect seems warranted.
Other legal contexts make clear that laws are assumed to have
effect even when no enforcement mechanisms are put in place. The
Supreme Court acknowledged and validated this assumption in Bow-
ers v. Hardwick.207 Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in Bowers in-
dicated that the Georgia sodomy law was only constitutional because
the state did not enforce it.208 Some regulations thus may be permissi-
ble only to the extent that they have symbolic, but not actual, effect.
Moreover, many state practices also attest to the assumption that
citizens will obey the law. For example, states do not police compli-
ance with regulations forbidding close relatives to marry. States con-
sider the disclosure of this type of law to marriage license appli-
cants—along with a clerk asking the couple to state that they are not
related in a way that would violate the law—to be enough of a deter-
rent. In such cases, people are presumed to be law-abiding and de-
terred from breaking the law by the knowledge of its existence.
Presumably, an approach similar to that noted above in the mar-
riage license context would be effective in the consent law context.
An abortion provider could disclose that parental consent is required
and verify that the signature on the permission slip is a parent’s, just
as the clinic did in Jackson. Notably, the consequences of fraud are
very similar in both the marriage license and consent contexts: in
both, the state interest involves protection of potential life. The ad-
206. The minors who actually obtain parental approval may be the same minors who have a
good-enough relationship with their parents that they would have gotten parental advice even
without a law requiring it. In fact, studies conducted in states without parental involvement
laws show that most parents who have knowledge of the pregnancy are told by the daughters
themselves, and that the great majority supported their daughters’ decisions to have abortions.
See Stanley K. Henshaw & Kathryn Kost, Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortion Decisions,
FAM. PLAN. PERSP., Sept./Oct. 1992, at 196, 196. Moreover, the actual effects of parental in-
volvement laws on minors who would not have otherwise sought advice may be negative, since
a third of all minors who decide not to tell a parent about their pregnancies and their decisions
to have abortions say that their decisions are motivated by a fear of violence based on earlier
experiences with parental violence. See id.
207. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
208. See id. at 197-98 (Powell, J., concurring) (opining that any punishment imposed on
someone for violation of a sodomy statute would be unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment).
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verse result of fraud might be the conception of a fetus with genetic
defects in the case of a closely related married couple, or an aborted
fetus in the case of a minor who fails to involve her parents in the
abortion decision.
Consent statutes would not be completely inoperative in the ab-
sence of abortion-provider liability. But even if they were, the fact
that the Casey Court found a state interest in certain abortion regula-
tions does not mean that states have a right to press those interests at
the expense of constitutionally protected rights.
CONCLUSION
By allowing states to legislate in the abortion arena, the Casey
Court has opened a back door through which the states can effec-
tively restrict the exercise of constitutional rights. Since the Casey de-
cision, the number of abortion providers has dropped at a rapid
rate.209 In the four-year period subsequent to Casey, the number of
physicians dropping abortion from their practices increased by more
than fifty percent compared to the four-year period preceding the de-
cision.210 This dramatic decline illustrates the way in which statutes
designed to promote informed decisionmaking may actually be
working to wrest decisions away from those who are constitutionally
entitled to make them.
Unfortunately, the actual effects of the statutes are not obvious,
precisely because they are indirect. The insidious legislation involved
is effective precisely because each individual provision appears in-
nocuous. Perhaps only the combined effect of regulations that appear
to impose strict liability, steadily increasing required paperwork, and
notification duties finally makes a previously dedicated doctor drop
abortion from his practice. These regulations are the “new battle-
field”211 for rights activists, a battlefield on which the attack does not
appear at first glance to be directed at the minors and adult women
whose rights are ultimately threatened. Yet, it is women—all
women—who are put at risk by these statutes. In upholding the right
of women to choose abortion, the Casey Court acknowledged that
“[t]he ability of women to participate equally in the economic and
social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control
209. See supra note 164.
210. See supra note 172.
211. Okpalobi v. Foster, 981 F. Supp. 977, 986 (E.D. La. 1998), aff’d 190 F.3d 337 (5th Cir.
1999).
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their reproductive lives.”212 Taken together, the post-Casey regula-
tions threaten this ability and thus should be invalidated. As one dis-
trict court judge has observed, “Such backhanded and subtle at-
tempts that chip away at a vital component of a person’s liberty will
not be tolerated.”213
212. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (joint opinion of O’Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
213. Okpalobi, 981 F. Supp. at 986.
